Chapter 9

Religious Violence and State Violence

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Notwithstanding Max Weber’s definition of the modern state as “the association that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence,” religious leaders have often refused to yield authority on the question: the state’s legal monopoly of violence does not render moral its every use of violence.¹

This chapter seeks to address a palpable neglect of systemic violence and state-sponsored terror in the literature on religion and violence.² This glaring omission of the role of the state tends to reinforce the biased assumption that religious violence and terrorism are the preserve of non-state actors. As I will demonstrate in what follows, the tendency to attribute deadly violence almost exclusively to non-state religious actors obscures the larger view of the interaction between religious and state actors and seriously distorts analysis of the phenomenon of religious involvement in deadly conflict.

There are a few rare exceptions to this myopia with respect to state violence, such as the context-specific studies of David Chidester (Shots in the Streets: Violence and Religion in South Africa³), Michael A. Sells (The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia⁴), and Paul Brass (The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India⁵). More recently, William T. Cavanaugh (2009) has produced a seminal study, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict,⁶ in which he turns on its head the “founding myth” of the dominant secularist paradigm of the twentieth century—that religion is inherently sectarian and thus has a distinctive proclivity for violence—and makes a compelling argument that the modern nation-state provoked the violence that has been credited to religion. These atypical and revisionary analyses illustrate the state’s complicity in fomenting violence.⁷ The lessons from them however, have been largely ignored in comparative and theoretical studies on religion and violence. I am curious to discover why.

This fault line is nowhere better illustrated than in the work of the American sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, one of the leading figures in current scholarship on religion and violence.⁸ Juergensmeyer is emblematic of a larger trend in the literature in which this
analytical slippage occurs. In his influential work *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (2000), while acknowledging that of “all of the worst incidences of genocidal killings this century have been perpetrated by public officials invoking a sort of state terrorism,” Juergensmeyer nevertheless proceeds to deal exclusively with the violence of non-state actors. As a result, the chief focus of his study is to describe the psychological mindset of these non-state actors, which renders them vulnerable to appropriate the violent elements of their religious texts. What he omits in his hermeneutical reading is that social text or context contributes equally to the violent appropriation of the sacred. Looming large in the social context is the state and its coercive ideological apparatuses.

Juergensmeyer’s widely read study ignores the dialogical nature of violence. Thus he concentrates solely on one side of the equation and denudes the state of any agency and responsibility in the production of violence. Unwittingly his monocausal analysis buttresses state authority and obscures the role of the state in complex conjunctions of violence.

The inattention to the role of the state in fomenting violence is striking, and it seems all the more anomalous given the fact that the hegemonic paradigm of most contemporary scholars is that of “modernity,” and political modernity, as the influential German sociologist Max Weber (d. 1920) recognized, depended upon the centralized state monopolizing the legitimate use of violence. Since Weber, every scholar of modernity acknowledges that not only political discourses but also ethical and sociological discourses are informed by and configured within the dominance and prerogatives of the state; it shapes every discourse, vision, and theory. S. Parvez Manzoor usefully captures this aspect of modernity. “The modern perception of reality,” Manzoor argues, “not only of the political world but also of the moral, aesthetic and intellectual dimensions of our existence, is largely through the prism of the state.” Why, then, is the state largely absent in current academic analyses of the role of religion in violence?

This chapter contends that there is an urgent need, in the words of some political theorists, to “bring the state back in[to]” theoretical discourses on religion and violence. My central argument is that an understanding of the state’s role in conflict, and in particular a critical appraisal of how it obtains its legitimacy and exercises its “monopoly of violence,” is crucial to a more nuanced grasp of the relationship between religion and violence. Such a balanced understanding of religious violence, in addition to increasing the accuracy of analysis, would contribute to the development of more effective methodologies in the subfield of religion, conflict transformation, and strategic peacebuilding.

In pursuit of my goal, I raise three interrelated research questions: First, how does the post–Cold War literature deal with the issue of systemic institutional violence and state-sponsored terror? Second, under what conditions and through which mechanisms are religious discourses and actors enlisted in legitimating the state’s use of violence? And, last but not least, how do current theories on religion and violence challenge and/or serve state interests in coercive practices?

In what follows, I argue that Western scholarly perspectives on religion and violence (which have become a growth industry since September 11, 2001) are artificially slanted toward state interests, to the detriment of those resisting state excesses in various contexts. In this regard, scholars and experts radically misunderstand the big picture of religions’ intersection with violence in the post–Cold War era. Are there examples of alternative scholarship that provide a corrective to this error?
My key hypothesis is that rethinking the nexus between religion and violence to include
the role of the state will inevitably lead us to a different appreciation of the relationship
between religion and violence. The “religion and violence” school of thought must be firmly
and radically expanded to constitute a triad of religion, violence, and the state. It is my hope
that this expanded analysis will augment the intellectual efforts of Cavanaugh and others to
develop what I call a polycentric (as opposed to Eurocentric and Weberian)\textsuperscript{14} theory of reli-
gion, violence, and the state that expands and deepens our understanding of religious vio-
lence and provides new resources for conflict transformation and strategic peacebuilding.

By exploring the intricate connections between religion, violence, and the state in three
diverse contexts—the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa (1948–1994), the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995), and the “communal” conflict in the Gujarat state of India
(2002)—this chapter seeks to amplify the rare existing studies that highlight the critical role
of the modern state in the production of violence.\textsuperscript{15} The three case studies developed in this
chapter identify different aspects of the nexus between religion and violence. But all three
point to the critical role of the state and illuminate the ways in which religion can sanctify
state-sponsored violence.

**RELIGION AND VIOLENCE UNDER
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA**

From 1948 to 1994, South Africa was governed by a system of structural violence known
as “apartheid.” This vicious system institutionalized the oppression and dehumanization of
people of color. It legalized racial discrimination, sociopolitical oppression, and economic
exploitation. Non-whites were forced to live in separate areas and were not allowed to vote.
According to David Chidester, under the apartheid system, “violence was everywhere. It was
an integral part of the discourses, practices and social formations through which human
beings struggled to be human.”\textsuperscript{16} This was the grim reality that South Africans had to con-
tend with for close to half a century until the historic nonracial elections held on April 27,
1994, that brought Nelson Mandela to power.

What is significant for our purpose here is that the white supremacist policy of apartheid
was created in the name of Calvinist Christianity. Many of the key leaders of the oppres-
sive apartheid regime were also devout adherents of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC).
The discriminatory apartheid education policy was labeled “Christian National Education.”
These facts spurred the composition of an important theological document, *The Kairos
Document* (1985), produced by black South Africans, which lamented this Christian legiti-
mation of the structural violence of apartheid.\textsuperscript{17}

I have found a conspicuous neglect of the South African case in the deluge of literature on
religion and violence that has flooded the market since the end of the Cold War. For example,
the bibliography of religion and violence compiled by Christopher Candland lists just over
a dozen entries.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, Candland’s choice of bibliographical subheadings is intrig-
ing. He lists case studies such as “Religious Violence in Nigeria and the Sudan,” “Religion in
the Conflict in Northern Ireland,” and “Violence and Religious Nationalism in South Asia.”
To categorize the South African situation, he chooses the curious title of “Afrikaner Violence
and Liberation Theology in Southern Africa.” The general impression is that religion was not implicated in the violence of apartheid, and that its roots lay elsewhere, in Afrikaner nationalism, and if indeed religion was involved in legitimating violence at all, it was doing so in support of the liberation movement. This one-sided perspective appears to be pervasive in the scholarship and thinking about religion and violence under apartheid.

The most prominent title in the scant catalogue on religion and violence in South Africa is an edited volume, Violence and Theology, by one of the most prolific scholars in the field, Charles Villa-Vicencio. He collected nineteen articles in which some of the most influential anti-apartheid theologians in South Africa, including Desmond Tutu, debated the theological roots of mainstream Christianity’s legitimation of state violence and its consequent disinclination to legitimate revolutionary violence in the struggle against apartheid. Most of the authors argue that the time for debating whether the church should support the revolutionary violence in South Africa is over, for by the mid-1980s, the conditions in apartheid South Africa were ripe for the application of the just war criteria set forth by classical theologians such as Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and John Calvin. This theological position is usefully depicted by Albert Nolan and Mary Armour: “The criteria of the just-war being present [in the South African situation] is not really at issue, in that ample evidence exists as regards the existence of a manifest longstanding tyranny.”

Theology and Violence powerfully captures the critique of anti-apartheid theologians regarding mainstream Christianity’s duplicitous position on the question of religion and violence. Along the way, the authors note the dominant tradition of the church blessing the state’s use of violence, while condemning violent revolution against the ruling authorities. “Suffice it to say that held captive to the dominant forces of what has come to be known as ‘Western Christian civilization,’ the Christian religion has come to be an important part of the ideological framework that has supported the existence of successive regimes in different parts of the world who affirm the dominant values of the West,” writes Villa-Vicencio. “And the inclination of the church to legitimate the use of violence by these regimes, while opposing revolutionary violence to overthrow such regimes, is a natural consequence of this ideological captivity.”

The rich essays contained in Villa-Vicencio’s edited volume are by far the most widely cited materials on religion and violence in South Africa. However, due to an explicit theological position, more general literature on religion and violence does not afford it a central location. Perhaps the reason for its neglect in the academy is its theological bias. For while this anthology includes some compelling arguments in support of revolutionary violence, and does raise some interesting theoretical questions, especially about the historical predisposition of the powerful elites for the religious legitimation of state violence, it is essentially a theological inquiry. The only two works that place the South African case within the context of the theoretical debate on religion and violence are Shots in the Streets, by David Chidester, and The Ambivalence of the Sacred, by Scott Appleby.

Chidester’s contribution is the only volume that deals exclusively with religion and violence in South Africa. More importantly, he is the only scholar who has applied the theoretical insights gained from the international debate to explicate the diverse ways in which religion was implicated in the violence of apartheid. Unlike most historians of religion, Chidester does not avoid the difficult challenge of defining violence. He confronts it head-on and not surprisingly chooses to start his analysis not with a single definition of violence but with four: direct physical harm, the violation of humanity, illegitimate force, or legitimate
He identifies three types of religious violence in South Africa as the focus of his study: ritual killing, dehumanization through torture, and the spiritual politics of the armed struggle against apartheid. Utilizing insights gleaned from the theory of René Girard on sacrifice and scapegoating, Chidester successfully demonstrates that two notorious cases of public violence—the execution of eight black pedestrians in the capital city of Pretoria by a white supremacist, Barend Strydom, and the public killing of a black community counselor by a gang of black township residents—followed a religious logic of sacrificial killing and ritual elimination.

Chidester's pioneering attempt to theorize violence and religion in South Africa has, however, made little impact on the broader debate within the Western academy. For example, in *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*, one of the only instances I have found of a significant treatment of the South African case in the theoretical literature on religion and violence, Chidester's volume is not cited. Nevertheless, Appleby's work deals with the South African case both within the broader theological as well as the theoretical debates on the religious legitimation of violence. He argues tangentially that during the apartheid era, the Dutch Reformed Church, as well as some charismatic and evangelical churches, deliberately chose not to challenge the oppressive apartheid system and that under “conditions of systemic, state-supported violence this was an unacceptable option” and essentially meant “support for the status quo by default.” Appleby employs the *Kairos Document* in making the case that both state theology and church theology were implicated in legitimating apartheid. In church theology, synthesizing the Kairos position, Appleby avers that “violence becomes part of the state propaganda. It refers to the actions of those who seek to overthrow unjust structures, but not to the violence of the structures, nor to the violence of the State in maintaining such structures.”

Demonstrating religious complicity with apartheid violence is, however, not Appleby's major thesis. On the contrary, he invokes the South African case as a plausible Christian argument for legitimating revolutionary violence in resisting and even overturning the apartheid state. Appleby carefully analyzes the theological positions on religion and violence in the context of apartheid of some of the most prominent South African anti-apartheid clerics, including Alan Boesak, Frank Chikane, and Buti Tlhagale. The following quotation from Desmond Tutu usefully captures the duplicity black Christians saw in the “mainstream tradition” on violence: “Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who plotted to murder Hitler, came to be regarded as a modern-day martyr and saint. But when it comes to the matter of black liberation, the West and most of the Church suddenly begins to show pacifist tendencies.”

Curiously, Appleby does not invoke the South African case as a model of any of his three typological patterns of religious violence, which he enumerates as fundamentalism, ethno-religious nationalism, and liberationism. However, one anthropologist who studies comparative religions, Richard T. Antoun, has made the case for one or other strand within the Afrikaner Reformed Church to be considered as typically fundamentalist. Antoun uses the Afrikaner reading of the Bible as a concrete example of what he calls “traditioning,” one of the key features of a fundamentalist movement. In my view, the DRC’s justification of apartheid would have made a useful example of ethno-religious nationalism. More pertinent, however, is Appleby's cogent synthesis of the moral arguments marshaled by the anti-apartheid churches in making a credible case to legitimate counter-violence against the apartheid state. This, in my perspective, may be an appropriate example of the
liberationist prototype and could be used to strengthen this unexplored dimension of Appleby’s typology.13

Regrettably, Appleby’s important reference to the South African case has not been recognized in any of the plethora of reviews of his book. Neither has this been taken up by any of the unprecedented number of books on religion and violence that have been written since its publication in 2000. Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that his analysis of the South African case is tucked away in the middle of chapter 1, in which he is elaborating elements of a theory of religion and violence rather than analyzing the case substantively on its own merits. Appleby’s treatment of apartheid South Africa is not unique but in the lack of attention it received, it shares the same plight as Chidester’s study; the scant impact of both show the striking neglect of the apartheid case in the proliferating literature on religion and violence.

The question of why this is so gets to the heart of my critique. I suggest three possible reasons for this neglect. The first might be that many scholars are not convinced that religion was implicated in apartheid violence. The second centers on the hypothesis of South African exceptionalism: the notion that the apartheid case is so unique that it does not correspond to other contexts in which religion has been implicated in violence.

But the third, and to my mind, most compelling explanation of this oversight is powerfully brought to the fore by the anti-apartheid Kairos theologians, who wrote that that “the Christian religion has come to be an important part of the ideological framework that has supported successive regimes in different parts of the world who affirm the dominant values of the West. And the inclination of the Church to legitimate the use of violence by these regimes is a natural consequence of this ideological captivity.”14 Transposing this critique to the Western academy, one may make a comparable proposal: Is the scholarly neglect of the South African case a reflection of the pro-state bias in the dominant literature on religion and violence?

In the next section of this essay, I explore how the lessons that might have been learned from the South African experience have eluded theorists in their attempts to account for the religious dimensions of the violence that engulfed the Balkans in the mid-1990s, ironically at the same time that South Africa was being liberated from apartheid.

**The Role of Religion in the Bosnian War: An Assessment of the Literature**

A resurgence of religious violence has caught the post–cold war world off guard. From the subways of Tokyo to the ruins of the mosque in India, from the World Trade Center and the federal building in Oklahoma City to a Jerusalem rally for the Israeli prime minister, religious militants have transgressed the boundaries of civil society in pursuit of their aims. Bosnians have faced the most brutal religious violence unleashed in the aftermath of the cold war.15

The quotation is taken from *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*, by Michael Sells. In the book, Sells makes a compelling case that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lasted from March 1, 1992, until December 14, 1995, should be considered a “religious genocide” in that “it was religiously motivated and religiously justified.” Sells argues that Serb aggression “was religious genocide in several senses: the people destroyed were chosen...”
on the basis of their religious identity; those carrying out the killings acted with the blessings and support of Christian church leaders; the violence was grounded in a religious mythology that characterized the targeted people as race traitors, and their extermination as a sacred act; and the perpetrators of the violence were protected by the policy makers of a Western world that is culturally dominated by Christianity. 36 Sells was fully aware that his “religious genocide thesis” was provocative and challenged conventional wisdom. In fact, this seems to have been one of the key purposes of the book.

Miroslav Volf takes issue with Sells’ interpretation of the role of religion in the Bosnian genocide. He argues that the “primary motivation for the war was not religious but rather political, economic and cultural.” When they claimed to be “fighting for our faith, the Serbian Orthodox Church,” Volf writes, were not “offering either the primary motivation or primary justification for their actions.” Rather, “religious rhetoric,” he goes on to argue, “is only one of the many rhetorics employed, and a subordinate one at that.” 37 Another Croatian historian of religion, Paul Mojzes, who has written extensively on the role of religion in the Balkans conflict, acknowledges the liberal use that was made of religious symbols and myths, as well as the complicity of high-profile religious leaders in supporting the atrocities. Nonetheless Mojzes also concludes that the war was primarily “ethnonationalist” not religious. 38

Notwithstanding this robust debate among scholars concerning the precise role of religion in the Bosnian War, no attention is given to the Bosnian conflict in the global survey of contemporary religious terror in Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God—a disconcerting fact. Among the eighty-five interviewees and correspondents he lists at the back of his book, there is not a single individual from the Balkans. 39 Moreover, Juergensmeyer mentions Bosnia only twice. Interestingly, the first time he refers to it is in the context of “state terrorism” and the second time he simply notes that “During the height of the conflict in Bosnia in the mid-1990’s . . . mosques stayed open and the symphony orchestra of Sarajevo kept to its concert schedule, performing to mixed audiences [sic].” 40

Highlighting this inconsistency in scholarship on the role of religion in the Bosnian conflict, Appleby argues that “some Western analysts, following the lead of the apologists for religion on the scene, downplayed the religious dimension of the war and argued that political, economic, and cultural factors were far more prominent in causing and sustaining it—as if ‘culture’ were a category somehow independent of religion.” 41 Appleby goes on to argue that by “excusing the religious leaders on the grounds that they were protecting their respective religious and cultural communities,” the “‘religion did not do it’ camp” inadvertently undermined their own claims. 42

In attempting to correct this apparent contradiction in Western scholarship on the role of religion in legitimating the violence in Bosnia, Appleby proceeds to develop a sophisticated analysis of what he calls “ethnoreligious” violence “because it is virtually impossible to disaggregate the precise roles of religion and ethnicity.” 43 He furthermore argues that “for many people, religion is intrinsically a part of the sense of ethnicity” and that religion more often than not does not break down ethnic barriers; on the contrary, it frequently fortifies them. 44 Drawing on the twin themes of mimesis and the scapegoat advanced by René Girard, Appleby’s analysis of the Bosnian conflict lends credence to the claim that it is sameness rather than difference that leads to mimetic rivalry and lies at the heart of the conflict. In support of his thesis he argues that the Serbs and Croats, “twinned tribes mutually scornful and yet imitative of each other, each desiring its own sacred nation with expanded ‘purified’
borders, found a handy scapegoat in the Muslims of Bosnia. Latecomers to the ways of ethno-religious nationalism, the Bosnian Muslims fell prey to the genocide-legitimating propaganda by which Christian extremists deemed them ‘race traitors’ and ‘apostates.”

Appleby’s account of the role of religion in the Bosnian War, however helpful and nuanced, falls short, ironically, of giving ethno-religious violence a subordinate position within his broader typology of post–Cold War religious violence. He gives it less weight than what he defines as “fundamentalist violence.” For Appleby, in the case of the former, religion is an accomplice to violence. But in “fundamentalist violence,” religion plays a preeminent role unencumbered by “ethnic” and “nationalist” considerations. While to his credit Appleby does argue that not all fundamentalists are violent, he still leaves the question open as to why it is that when Christians are complicit in legitimating violence, as was the case in the Balkans, the role of religion is inferior or dependent—unlike when Muslims are implicated, as for example in the cases of Lebanon and the Sudan, both of which Appleby depicts as fundamentalist types of violence. Recent events in both of these countries have adequately demonstrated that the conflicts cannot be reduced to religion. The March 2005 assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri sparked widespread protests in that country, supported equally by Muslims and Christians. Moreover, the brutal campaigns by the Arab-dominated northern Sudanese regime to put down a rebellion by black tribes in the Darfur region of Western Sudan has shown that the conflict in that country has, in addition to the religious dimension, strong racial and ethnic overtones. How else is one to explain the fact that the Arab North as well as its Darfur adversaries are both predominantly Muslim?  

Almost two decades after the war in Bosnia there are still vigorous debates concerning the causes and nature of the conflict. Sells has argued that the Belgrade regime under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic and the newly established Croatian state under the leadership of Franco Tudjman were directly implicated in generating the atrocities perpetrated against Bosnian Muslims. His view resonates with the conclusions of some of the most influential scholars who have written on the Bosnian War, such as Roy Gutman and Norman Cigar. All these scholars agree that the war can be classified as ethnic cleansing and genocide and that it would not have been possible without the active involvement of the state. More significantly, this perspective has been buttressed by a judgment handed down at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (in The Hague).

Of course, other scholars have denied the plausibility of genocide. How does one make sense of such diverse scholarly assessments of the Bosnian War? I contend that this divergence of scholarly opinion, while in itself reflecting an essential part of the nature of the academy, is not immune to political conditioning. This vulnerability is not unique to the academy, however, but is even more apparent in international institutions. For example, all the major international institutions, including the UN and the European Union, failed to fully appreciate the role of state authorities in the Bosnian conflict. Underscoring such a critique, de Graaff maintains that “the centrality of the state was often overlooked in the West, because state actors in Former Yugoslavia tried to hide that they were behind the violence, as well as how they aimed at creating new states.” I would add that hegemonic intellectual paradigms, which privilege the state, have also contributed to obscuring the insidious role of the state.

We turn now to India, complicating the picture further by looking at a discourse yet more alien to the Western academy—that of Hinduism.
Indian government officials have acknowledged that since February 27, 2002, more than 850 people have been killed in communal violence in the state of Gujarat, most of them Muslims... The attacks on Muslims are part of a concerted campaign of Hindu nationalist organizations to promote and exploit communal tensions to further the [Bharatiya Janata Party’s] political rule—a movement that is supported at the local level by militant groups that operate with impunity and under the patronage of the state.

The above quotation comes from a Human Rights Watch report on the communal violence that engulfed the Western Indian state of Gujarat in February and March of 2002. Its conclusion states: "State officials of Gujarat, India, were directly involved in the killings of hundreds of Muslims since February 27 and are now engineering a massive cover-up of the state's role in the violence." This statement confirms an earlier, independent report by India's National Human Rights Commission. Not surprisingly however, the charge of state complicity in the violence was highly controversial and contested.

It is to be expected that opinions about a sensitive topic such as the causes of an outbreak of violence between members of two different religious groups will invariably differ radically. One of the most striking aspects of the case of the Gujarat violence of 2002, however, is the near unanimity of the judgment. More than sixty national and international agencies who investigated the 2002 Gujarat violence all concluded that officials of the Gujarat state were complicit. Scholarly opinions have been no less unanimous. Paul Brass, Ashutosh Varshney, Peter van der Veer, Upendra Bax, and Ashgar Ali Engineer all agree that the violence was not a spontaneous reaction but was in fact orchestrated by groups closely aligned to the Sangh Parivar and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government. Two of these scholars who hold opposing theoretical perspectives—Brass and Varshney—have both felt confident enough to declare the 2002 communal violence of Gujarat a "pogrom." In the case of Varshney, this is particularly revealing: he has never applied this strong label to any other incident of violence in post-independence India, including the anti-Sikh violence that broke out in Delhi after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. In fact, he has been at the forefront of arguing against scholars such as Brass that the anti-Sikh violence of 1984 was not a pogrom. This time, albeit cautiously, Varshney says, "Unless later research disconfirms the proposition, the existing press reports give us every reason to conclude that the riots in Gujarat were the first full-blooded pogrom in independent India." Varshney has been careful to nuance his bold position by arguing that the existing evidence suggested that at least in March if not in April 2003 the culpability of the state lay in condoning the killings. He suggested that the contention that the government officially encouraged anti-Muslim violence cannot be conclusively proved on the basis of existing evidence. He did, however, leave the door open for such a proposition to be proven by later research.

In contradistinction, Brass has taken a much bolder position and has invoked the Gujarat 2002 case as clear evidence in support of his major thesis that most, if not all, of the communal violence in contemporary India does not arise spontaneously but rather is consciously orchestrated, or in his words, "produced by institutionalized riot systems." One is tempted to ask: Could this be the case with the Gujarat riots of 2002?
More than a decade after the tragedy, the condemnation and calls for justice for the victims have not dissipated but become even stronger. In January 2005, Amnesty International released their investigative report on the 2002 communal violence in Gujarat:

[1] In relation to the violence in Gujarat in 2002, India has not fulfilled its obligations to protect fundamental rights guaranteed in its constitution and in international treaties to which it is a party. Reports received from human rights groups in India indicate that the Government of Gujarat may have been complicit in at least part of the abuses perpetrated in Gujarat in 2002. There is evidence of connivance of authorities in the preparation and execution of some of the attacks and also in the way the right to legal redress of women victims of sexual violence has been frustrated at every level. Furthermore, the Gujarat state has failed to meet their international obligations to bring to justice perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

Like all the investigative reports, the Amnesty International report makes for shocking reading. It concludes that the violence in Gujarat was not merely a failure of law and order, but was deliberately planned with the active knowledge and involvement of key government and police officials.

In March 2005, a campaign was launched in the United States by the Coalition Against Genocide to prevent the Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, from entering the country to speak at the Annual Convention and Trade Show convened by the Asian American Hotel Owners Association in Florida on March 24–26, 2005. On the same visit, Modi was also scheduled to speak at Madison Square Garden in New York on March 20. In their memorandum calling on the US State Department to withdraw Modi’s visa, the coalition claimed that Modi was in violation of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 and other international laws and that the Modi government in Gujarat was responsible for the deaths of thousands of its citizens, organized violence, large-scale displacement of minority populations, and continuing denial of justice. The coalition also noted that two civil suits had been filed against Modi for crimes against humanity and genocide. Not least, “a climate of terror permeates civil society in Gujarat even today.”

To the astonishment of many observers, the coalition’s demand was heeded and Modi’s US visa was revoked. In a statement justifying the visa withdrawal, the US embassy in India said that the visa had been revoked under “Section 604 of the International Religious Freedom Act which makes any foreign official who has engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom inadmissible to the US.”

Modi claimed that it was the Gujarat government’s stand against religious conversions in the state that was the main reason for the withdrawal of his visa. “They [Americans] think that by providing monetary benefits, they can conduct [religious] conversions in the state. But that person (Modi) did not allow it to happen and so was denied a visa,” he said in a press statement afterwards. Through this statement, Modi was of course cynically trying to exploit one of the major sources of religious conflict in contemporary India, namely, that of the Hindu opposition to Christian proselytism. This is a useful example of the manner in which a highly placed politician may appeal to religious grievances in order to advance his political agenda and interests.

After a comprehensive survey of the welter of investigative reports, proliferating scholarly opinions, and active human rights campaigns, one may safely conclude that the BJP government of the state of Gujarat and its supporting Hindu religious network, the Sangh Parivar, were complicit in the violence directed against Muslims in 2002. What implications does this
clear-cut case of state-sponsored violence targeting a community defined by ethno-religious boundaries hold for theories of religion and violence?

It is instructive to note that a decade later, there are very few scholarly treatises within the Western academy focusing on the Gujarat case. In fact, most of them are edited volumes that have been published in India. There appears to be a palpable neglect of scholarly works that clearly implicate the state. I propose that one reason why instances such as that of Gujarat are unconsciously ignored is that they do not fit into what I would describe as the pro-statist Weberian paradigm within which much of the current research on religion and violence operates. The unfortunate result is that religious violence is reduced to the activities of non-state actors. The state is often absent from, or occupies a very small role in contemporary accounts of religious violence. Applying this to the case of India, the dominant discourse defines the Kashmir and Sikh activists seeking self-determination as terrorists par excellence, while the role of the Indian state in spawning religious violence is ignored, and would only become visible in an extreme case such as that of the former Taliban regime of Afghanistan.

It is here that there appears to be a major problem in the perspectives of scholars who are more attuned to recognizing the awesome power of the state in fomenting violence. Swami Agnivesh argues that the modern nation-state has been wrapped in “a certain aura of legitimacy.” This, he claims, is why people initially found it hard to believe that the Gujarat state was implicated in the brutal killings of Muslims in 2002. Agnivesh contends that the chief lesson from the Gujarat tragedy is the following: “What is far more dangerous and reprehensible in the contemporary age [than the religiously motivated violence of non-state actors] is the potential of the state itself becoming an instrument of genocide or carnage.” The reasons for this, he claims, are twofold: “First, the real actor [in state violence] is faceless, and second, state-sponsored genocide is legitimized and camouflaged by the fact that government has come to power through democratic means and has the support of the constitution.” He provides Hitler and the Nazi regime as a clear example of this: “Hitler came to power through democratic means and used his position to exterminate the Jews.” He further argues:

One of the chief reasons why Hitler was able to get away with his policy of genocide against the Jews was that it took a long time for people to realize what was happening. When it was happening many people did not realize it, because they were deluded by the fact that it was a democratically elected government. The case of the BJP-led government of Narendra Modi and his Gujarat pogrom is very similar. I have been warning people about it for a long time, but no one cared to listen. Agnivesh believes that religious activists as well as other civil society activists, should be vigilant, constantly monitoring the state so as to counterbalance the tendency not to question the exercise of its awesome coercive powers. This is precisely how he conceives of his own role in relationship to politics and the state. His constructive example of the role of religion in the public sphere is, however, not unique. There are numerous other examples that need to be lifted up so that the reality of religion in public life is evaluated in a more positive and comprehensive manner in the academic literature. But what about the key theoretical question of the ever-present potential of the state to become an instrument of carnage and genocide? When will this be taken seriously by scholars of religion and violence?

It is encouraging to note that recently a few scholars have, in fact, tried to incorporate the destructive potential of the state into their theorizing of the question of violence. These
scholars have been drawing on the theories of the biopolitical state first formulated by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and later taken up slightly differently by the Italian scholar Giorgio Agamben. Both critics attempted to uncover and denaturalize the logic of state sovereignty and power.

One of the Indian scholars associated with the Subaltern Studies project, Angana P. Chatterji, has already begun to apply some of these novel insights into her analysis of Hindu nationalism and communal violence in India. Anthropologist Veena Das has raised the vexing question of how the biopolitical state, which is invested with the responsibility of preserving and managing bare life, can also allow and even cause the death of significant parts of the population. "We are living in an era in which the state is more in the business of producing killable bodies than that of managing life," she contends. In support of her contention, she cites the mass killings and plundering of Muslims in Gujarat in February and March 2002 as an instructive example.

These new theoretical perspectives provide us with some hope for the emergence of a polycentric perspective of religion and violence that fully integrates the important role of the state into its analysis. It is disconcerting to note, however, that these scholarly endeavors, especially those of the Subaltern school, are not considered part of mainstream scholarship in the Western academy. Their novel and challenging theoretical insights are currently marginalized in the mainstream disciplines of the social sciences. They are conspicuously absent from the growing sub-discipline of religion and violence.

The case of the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 once again illustrates the critical importance of holding onto a broader definition of violence that does not exclude systemic and structural violence. The tragic lesson from Gujarat is that the aura surrounding the awesome power of the modern nation-state has further buttressed the inherent tendency of the state to commit excesses in the execution of its legitimate coercive force. This, I propose, needs to be challenged. Unfortunately, theorists of religion and violence in the Western academy have not yet taken this perspective on the state seriously enough. Such a polycentric theoretical focus is, however, evident in the research work of the Subaltern Studies project and especially in the work of Veena Das.

The analysis of Gujarat in this essay concludes my three case studies and represents a third instance of how the modern nation-state is deeply implicated in the production of violence, and how organized religion, instead of countering it, only too often serves to further legitimate it.

**Towards a Theory of Religion, Violence, and the State**

A survey of the scholarly writing on religion and violence over the past two decades has led me to conclude that it is inadequate in accounting for systemic violence, in that it tends to ignore state-sponsored terror. The paradigm stands: the state is a neutral or an unmarked category, while non-state activists are the religiously motivated purveyors of violence.

Inattention to the lessons of the South African case exposes the deficiencies of theories on religion and violence and reminds us of the conditioning effect of power on scholarly
analysis of the causes of violence. I offer at least two possible explanations for this bias in the prevailing theoretical perspectives on religion and violence. First, I attribute it to the widely held assumption derived from the state-centric Weberian paradigm that state violence is "legitimate." From this vantage point, state violence by definition is viewed as force gone wrong. By implication, therefore, the force employed by the state, even if it results in direct physical harm, cannot be regarded as violence, since it is employed in order to enforce the law. Such definitions that privilege the state's use of violence inevitably have the double effect of delegitimizing the use of violence by non-state actors under any and all circumstances and obscuring the excesses of the state in the exercise of its power.

Second, I point to the conditioning influence of political location in the framing of academic discourse. In this matter, anthropologist Jeffrey Sluka observes that "academics, media and governments neglect state terror in their diagnosis of violence due to their own political and ideological biases rather than empirical evidence." Sluka's contention has been confirmed by the findings of an international comparative study conducted at the University of Hawaii. The study found that state-sponsored violence, measured by the number of killings, far outweighs that of the violence perpetrated by non-state actors. Yet despite this compelling empirical evidence, one hears more about the terror and violence perpetrated by non-state actors than those of the state.

Demonstrating the complicity of the scholarly community in such distorted analysis, Chidester reinforces Sluka's claim by stating that "academic institutions, disciplines, teaching and research are necessarily implicated in the ceremonies of power in the network of social relations within which they operate." Illustrating that problem, Mahmood Mamdani calls to our attention the fact that two of the leading proponents of the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, have both served as political advisors to the United States policy establishment dating back to the end of the Vietnam War.

The three case studies to which I have drawn attention—South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Gujarat, India—accentuate different aspects of the nexus of religion and violence. However, they have one key thing in common: they point to the critical role of the state. In particular, all three illuminate the manner in which religion can buttress and sanctify state-sponsored violence.

The case of apartheid South Africa provides a particularly compelling critique of the existing theories on religion and violence. It exposes their paucity and underscores the importance of broadening the existing academic definition of violence to include that of systemic state violence. The fact that David Chidester's endeavor to apply the theoretical insights gained from the apartheid case to the international discourse on religious violence has been completely disregarded in the broader debate within the Western academy is instructive in this regard.

The case of the state of Gujarat in India provides further empirical support for the view that state-sponsored violence is one of the most important sources of contemporary violence. The aura that surrounds the awesome power of the modern nation-state has further reinforced the state's natural tendency toward excess in the execution of its "legitimate" coercive force. Although a few scholars such as the anthropologist Veena Das have studied the issue, this perspective on the state has unfortunately not yet been taken seriously enough by most theorists of religion and violence in the Western academy.

The Bosnian case illustrates the difficulty of disentangling the religious from the ethnic, and these in turn, from the socio-economic and political factors in situations of deadly
conflicts. It also provides a strong example of the denial of the complicity of religion in state-sponsored violence. Is this perhaps one reason why Michael Sells’s seminal study on religious genocide and the critical role of the Serbian state in Bosnia has been largely ignored in the comparative and theoretical studies on religion and violence?

**Conclusion**

The conclusion that these three cases lead us to is inescapable: the modern nation-state has to be brought centrally into our theorizing of religion and violence.

At the outset of my essay, I hypothesized that incorporating the role of the state into the existing theory of religion and violence would make it possible to construct a more nuanced and polycentric (as opposed to Eurocentric) theory of religion, violence, and the state. Instead of aiming for a single overarching and all-comprehensive *theory* to add to the religion and violence literature, I propose a new *framework* for the analysis of situations of religious violence. I choose a framework rather than a typology in order to accommodate the range of empirical circumstances with which we are confronted when we observe religion and violence. Through reviewing the religion and violence literature, I note the primarily *dyadic* quality of most scholars’ analyses. The frame of discourse moves from the pole of religion to the pole of violence, remaining mute regarding the role of the governing state. I propose, therefore, that a frame of analysis that is *triadic* rather than dyadic be foundational to the field of religion and violence—and the state. This framework is illustrated in Figure 9.1.

Of course, not every case in which religion and violence are implicated involves the state. Nor does every case in which the state confronts a violent insurgency contain a religious element. The religious and nonreligious variables in deadly conflict are configured differently in disparate contexts. In the frame of analysis I propose, one of the elements may well be null in any given case. The point is, however, that in today’s world it has become clear—as illustrated in the three cases examined in this essay—that one must start with the assumption of a threefold rather than twofold framework. That is the essential contribution of this essay.

![Figure 9.1](image-url)
A Eurocentric and Weberian view, as I have demonstrated, privileges the state and treats state violence as sui generis, not comparable to all other forms of violence. By contrast, a polycentric theory of religion, violence, and the state will end this privileging and introduce a dialogical relationship in what I call a triad of elements.

Perhaps we have celebrated the death of the state too soon. Certainly those who have suffered the state’s excesses, such as those survivors of crimes against humanity fighting for justice in The Hague, or those who continue to suffer arbitrary detention in many parts of the world, or those increasing victims of targeted assassinations by drones, do not doubt that the state continues to live, flourish, and kill.

Notes

7. There are, of course, a few others, but these are few and far between, and their insights have not been taken up seriously in the dominant emerging theories on religion and violence in the post–Cold War era.
8. Mark Juergensmeyer is Director of the Orfalea Center for Global and International Studies and Professor of Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the 2004 recipient of the Silver Medal Award of the Queen Sofia Center for the Study of Conflict in Valencia, Spain. He is currently recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on “religious violence.” For a full biography, see http://www.global.ucsb.edu/faculty/juergensmeyer.html.
15. Here I will be drawing extensively from my doctoral thesis, “Religion, Violence, and the State: A Dialogical Encounter Between Activists and Scholars” (University of Cape Town, 2005).
20. Charles Villa-Vicencio has been one of the most productive scholars in analyzing the debate about the role of Christianity in relation to apartheid. For some of his work, see Villa-Vicencio, Trapped in Apartheid: Socio-Theological History of the English-Speaking Churches (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988).
23. Villa-Vicencio, Theology and Violence, 2.
24. See, for example, Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred, p. 318 nn. 41, 45, and 48.
25. Chidester, Shots in the Streets, x–xii and p. 173 n. 3. For a later elaboration of his views on the contested definitions of violence, see Chidester, “Comprehending Political Violence,” in Dealing with Diversity: Keywords for a New South Africa, ed. Emile Boonzaier and John Sharp (Cape Town: David Phillip, forthcoming).
28. One reviewer has suggested that the reason Chidester’s contribution has not made a wider impact is its “de- and reconstructionist” style. See Pierre L., van den Bergh, review of Shots in the Streets: Violence and Religion in South Africa, by David Chidester, Contemporary Sociology 21, no. 3 (1992): 324–325.
31. Appleby, Ambivalence of the Sacred, 57–120.


42. Appleby, *Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 68.


44. Appleby, *Ambivalence of the Sacred*, 62. Appleby provides the examples of Bosnia, which included “Bosnian Serbs,” “Bosnian Croats,” and “Bosnian Muslims,” as well as Sri Lanka, where the Sinhala majority “invoked Buddhism as a basis for legitimating Sinhala cultural and political preeminence in Sri Lanka.” In each case, it was religion wed to ethnicity that distinguished each “ethnic” group from the other.


46. For such a view, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).


51. The term “harvest of hate” comes from the title of Swami Agnivesh’s book and is very suggestive of his overall thesis that the Gujarat massacres were not spontaneous but the outcome of a well-orchestrated plan that had been in the making for some time. Swami Agnivesh and Valson Thampu, eds., *Harvest of Hate: Gujarat Under Siege* (Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2002).


58. van der Veer, “Tradition and Violence in South Asia” (keynote address, conference of the Kroc Institute’s Program in Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, April 11–12, 2003). For a report on the conference, see Peace Colloquy, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 18–19.


61. “It is sometimes suggested that the anti-Sikh violence in Delhi, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 30, 1984, was the first pogrom of independent India. This argument is not plausible.” Varshney, “Understanding Gujarat Violence.”

62. Varshney, “Understanding Gujarat Violence.” I have not seen any subsequent writings by Varshney that would contradict his initial judgment that it was a pogrom.


64. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 32.


66. This coalition represents a spectrum of organizations and individuals in the United States and Canada that have come together in response to the Gujarat genocide to demand accountability and justice.


70. I have not found a single volume written exclusively on the communal violence of Gujarat 2002. Paul Brass has contributed a few pages to it in the conclusion of his latest book (Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, 386–392).

72. Agnivesh, interview.
73. Agnivesh, interview.
78. Juergensmeyer has written widely on religion and violence, but I have not found any references to the South African case in any of his work.
82. Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2009), 20–21.

**Bibliography**

**Works Cited**


**Further Reading**


